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OVER THE LAST 40 YEARS THE ROLE OF FINANCE and the importance of the
financial sector in the Canadian and other advanced economies have grown
substantially. For instance, financial liabilities have risen sharply relative to
GDP and trading volumes have surged. Finance operates through a complex
system of interconnected institutions (banks, dealers, insurers), markets
(equities, fixed income, futures, derivatives), infrastructures (monetary sys-
tem, payments and settlements) and interventions by governments as issuers,
regulators and participants. The financial system plays a vital role in support-
ing and promoting economic activity by facilitating payments, transforming
the maturities of assets and liabilities to suit the needs of households and
1 The author wishes to thank Richard Dion for his extraordinarily valuable assis-
tance and Fred Gorbet and Nick Le Pan for their helpful comments. The author
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businesses, and transferring funds from savers to borrowers and investors.
But it is vulnerable to contagion and subject to occasional turbulence and
even crisis, which in turn may greatly harm the economy. Thus, in national
jurisdictions including Canada, policy regarding the financial system should
simultaneously  promote two goals:
• Efficiency: facilitate the allocation of savings to the most productive uses
by borrowers at low risk-adjusted intermediation costs (long-term growth
and economic development); and
• Stability: at the macro level, minimize the contribution of the financial
system to the inherent cycles of optimism/pessimism in the real economy
(leaning against the wind); at the institutional level, minimize the risk of
failure that could have systemic consequences; at the market level, assure
continuous markets
At the broadest level, policy should facilitate the development of markets
and institutions which enhance efficiency and innovation while at the same
time assuring the macro stability of the system. These are often complemen-
tary objectives. Well-designed rules promoting financial stability bolster an
efficient allocation of resources in general. Financial instability increases risk
premiums and deters investment. In some instances, however, efficiency and
stability can be conflicting objectives. Financial innovation can become a
source of instability if regulation and risk management in the financial institu-
tions fall behind the curve, as they did in at least two major episodes over the
last century.  Indeed, the global record seems to be one in which policy tends
to focus on efficiency until evidence of financial fragility and stress emerges,
and sometimes a financial crisis erupts. Hence, in the 1930s and late 2000s
emphasis squarely shifted to stability amid financial crises that followed bouts
of financial exuberance during which efficiency retained the attention of pol-
icy-makers more than stability.
As a legacy of the financial crisis of the 1930s, financial systems in Canada
and elsewhere in the world in the decades after the Second World War were
highly constrained by regulation operating largely through detailed controls.
Monetary policy made heavy use of quantitative controls. In Canada then
came the Porter Report in the mid-60s, which emphasized the importance of
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tory framework conducive to greater efficiency, including with respect to
securities markets. This provided the impetus for a set of policies that put
much greater emphasis on promoting efficiency from the late 1960s to the
early 1980s. Then for 25 years or so thereafter, policy pursued stability along
with efficiency. The catalyst for renewed emphasis on stability was the failure
of two small domestic banks in the mid-1980s. More recently, the global finan-
cial crisis has squarely directed the attention of Canadian policy-makers on
stability, although not because of troubles with weak bank balance sheets but
as part of an international effort to bolster liquidity and stability in a world of
interconnected financial institutions and markets.
Until the recent crisis, the growing scale and complexity of finance were
widely believed to enhance both efficiency and stability, although such an
assumption was less strong in Canada than in some other countries, notably
the United States. Canadian financial institutions took a more cautious
approach to financial innovation at some cost to their short-term growth and
profits relative to more leveraged foreign competitors, relied relatively less on
wholesale funding and kept relatively more liquidity. In part, this stemmed
from more stringent, coordinated and effective regulation and supervision in
Canada, which provided the right incentives to financial institutions. More-
over, the domestic mortgage market was not a source of instability in the
Canadian financial system, in part because mortgage lending standards
remained relatively high, mortgage securitization relatively low, and the gen-
eration of complex, risky products quite limited. If there was a problem to fix
in Canada, it was with respect to improving the regulation and supervision of
the issuance of complex securities to inadequately informed investors, as the
the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) episode illustrates. On a broader
front, authorities in Canada as in other jurisdictions felt the need to increase
the transparency of transactions in derivative and complex products through
changes in market infrastructure. Moreover the funding pressures that Cana-
dian financial institutions episodically experienced during the financial crisis
reminded everyone of the importance of continuous markets. All this being
said,  the “boring” Canadian financial system remained robust during the crisis
and Canadian taxpayers were spared the burden of bailing out troubled finan-
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Besides concerns for financial stability, concerns about the cost and quality
of the financial services provided to Canadians have held in check potential
gains of efficiency in the Canadian financial system. Indeed in part such con-
cerns led the federal government to reject proposals for bank mergers in the
late 1990s. At the same time, the long-standing resistance of provincial gov-
ernments to abandon a decentralized system of provincial securities regulation
in favour of a single national securities regulator has likely reduced the coun-
try’s capacity to oversee effectively the functioning and evolution of securities
markets and establish effective forms of cooperation with other financial sys-
tem regulators in Canada and capital market regulators in other countries.
The above constraints on potential gains in efficiency, which are unrelated
to stability considerations, can be seen as pertaining to a third set of goals
comprising access to quality financial services at reasonable costs and develop-
ment of national financial institutions and markets. The latter goal was pur-
sued through regulatory and policy efforts to encourage the development of
local or regional financial institutions and through measures to preserve the
domestic markets for Canadian financial institutions. Since my objective in
this paper is to examine the Canadian financial system in light of the evolving
balance of efficiency and stability over time, for all intents and purposes I will
refrain from effectively dealing in any detail with access to services and pro-
motion of national financial institutions and markets.
That still leaves many instructive lessons to take from how Canada has man-
aged its financial system over the last 40 years or so. This paper therefore aims
to trace the development of Canadian financial market policy from the Porter
Commission to the present; first, to assess its successes and shortcomings in
meeting the twin objectives of efficiency and stability and dealing with their
inherent conflicts; and, to examine the challenges ahead in light of what we
have learned from the current financial crisis.
Canadian Financial Market Policy
Canada has shown an uncommon propensity for bold initiatives regarding
the financial system in the immediate decades following the second world war.
The move to a flexible exchange rate in the 1950s was a daring, successful
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in the wake of the Porter Commission recommendations in the mid-1960s was
an even more profound transformation, ahead of its time.
The evolution of the Canadian financial system in the last 40 years or so has
been the product of both regulatory and market-driven changes. Initially
guided by the Porter Commission, amendments to the Bank Act from 1967
onwards have been key vehicles of regulatory changes. One of their main goals
has been to stimulate competition in, and the competitiveness of, the financial
sector by allowing its various institutions to respond to technological changes,
the globalization of financial services, and demographic developments as they
shape the desired asset-liability structure of household portfolios (Freedman,
1998). It is also worth noting that the 5-year sunset clause introduced with the
1992 amendments (in replacement of the previous 10-year sunset clause)
ensures a frequent review of the effectiveness of federal financial institutions
legislation respecting the objectives of stability, efficiency and innovation. It
also enables the government to respond to changes requested by the federal
financial institutions. The importance of this clause can hardly be exaggerated
because it has imposed a continuous adaptation of laws and regulations to
changes in financial instruments and markets rather than infrequent but mas-
sive overhauls. This adaptive process has more chance to bring and preserve
the right balance of efficiency and stability.
The 1964 report of the Porter Commission set an important goal for future
Bank Act revisions by promoting competition both within the banking system
and between banks and other financial institutions as a way to achieve a safe,
efficient, equitable and adaptable financial system. It also recommended that
“government securities regulation should be further strengthened and a fed-
eral regulatory agency established” to give leadership in the development of
high and uniform standards of securities regulation and legislation and to
work in cooperation with provincial authorities.” While its impact on the reg-
ulation of financial institutions has been considerable, securities regulation
has remained firmly in the hands of provincial governments.
The 1967 Bank Act revisions removed interest rate ceilings on bank loans,
introduced federal deposit insurance, permitted banks to invest in non-
insured mortgages and to borrow by selling debentures, and imposed individ-
ual and aggregate (for non-residents) ownership limits on the shares of banks.86 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
Subsequent amendments, especially those of 1987 and 1992, largely eroded
the former segmentation of the financial system across its five pillars (char-
tered banks, trust and loan companies, co-operative credit movement, life
insurance companies and securities dealers). An amendment in 1980 allowed
banks to have subsidiaries operating in various financial areas (e.g. venture
capital, mortgage loans) and foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in Canada;
then in 1987 banks were allowed to acquire securities dealers; and, finally, in
1992 various regulated financial institutions were allowed to enter each
other's business directly, through subsidiaries or as agents. Thus, by the early
1990s, financial institutions could develop into financial conglomerates, and
indeed Canadian chartered banks did quickly become universal banks (except
for limitations on investments in non-financial business and prohibition of
retailing of life insurance), partly through mergers with or acquisitions of trust
companies and investment dealers. In part, the resulting breakdown of seg-
mentation reflects an adaptive response to the intensifying concerns about the
future profitability and competitiveness of Canadian banks in a world of
increasing market funding for corporations, securitization, globalization, and
integration of financial functions. One important consequence of being uni-
versal banks that provide one-stop service for the (almost) full range of house-
hold investment vehicles has been a high ratio of depository funding to total
assets, which in turn was a key factor behind the relative resilience of Canadian
banks during the financial crisis (Ratnovski and Huang, 2009). As a comple-
ment to the breakdown of domestic segmentation, foreign banks were allowed
in 1999 to establish branches in Canada, as opposed to subsidiaries only,
thereby fostering competition and providing greater flexibility for foreign
banks operating in Canada.
Efficiency gains in intermediating between savers and borrowers/investors
were considerable, the range of products on offer to savers and borrowers at
affordable costs expanded enormously, and transactions in foreign currencies
and with non-residents increased vigorously. Regulatory and market-driven
developments have led to upward trends in the bank shares of consumer loans
and mortgage loans, and to a lesser extent business loans, from the late 1970's
onwards (Freedman, 1998; Calmès, 2004). At the same time, the share of loans
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been on a downward trend as issuance of stocks, bonds and, from the mid-
1990s, commercial paper has grown much faster. For banks, which have
become heavily involved in the flotation of corporate securities, this has con-
tributed to the observed shift in the sources of revenues from interest income
on loans to non-interest income from fees and off-balance-sheet activities. On
the funding side for banks, reliance on wholesale markets tended to grow
somewhat faster than retail deposits, but has diminished substantially as a pro-
portion of total funding since late 2008.
Along with changes to the Bank Act, a few important steps were taken to
strengthen the infrastructure and regulatory framework of the financial sys-
tem. In 1980, Parliament created by legislation a new Canadian Payments
Association (CPA), which comprises both banks and non-bank deposit-taking
institutions, to take over responsibility for running the cheque-clearing sys-
tem from the Canadian Bankers Association and to assume responsibility for
planning the future evolution of the Canadian payments system. One signal
achievement of the CPA together with the Bank of Canada has been the build-
ing and implementation from 1999 onwards of Canada’s large-value transfer
system (LVTS) which provides clearing and settlement services to financial,
corporate and government entities via chartered banks and other large
deposit-taking institutions. Among other things, this contributed to a more
predictable cost of overnight funding for financial institutions. LVTS exceeds
world standards for risk control, and at a low cost (Longworth, 2006). This
system continued to function well throughout the financial crisis, thereby sup-
porting markets and financial institutions.
The increasing importance of electronic and mobile banking and unregu-
lated e-payment systems (e.g. PayPal), and more generally incessant techno-
logical advances, raises the question of how the current payment arrangements
need to evolve to be effective and efficient in the decades ahead. Quite appro-
priately, the Minister of Finance is engaged in a review of the payments sys-
tem. Here again, achieving the right balance between efficiency and stability
will be important.
Since 1987, the regulatory and supervisory framework has improved sub-
stantially, but only after the failure of Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) and
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sion of deposit-taking institutions.2 The financial stress caused by the extraor-
dinary surge of interest rates in the early 1980s to tame inflation contributed
to the ultimate demise of these two small banks. Up to the late 1980s, the
supervision of deposit-taking institutions “had been compromised by ambigu-
ity about the role and mandate of supervision and by weak incentives to
respond effectively to troubled institutions” (Engert, 2005). This was evident
not only in the failures of the two Canadian banks but also in the increased
deposit insurance liability and losses of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (CDIC). This episode heightened the perceived need to reinforce the
incentives and ability of supervisory institutions to deal effectively with failing
financial institutions.
In the wake of the Estey Commission recommendations, important reforms
took place in 1987 to strengthen the “financial safety net.” First, a newly-cre-
ated Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) replaced
the Department of Insurance and the Office of the Inspector General of
Banks, with the mandate to supervise all federally-chartered depository insti-
tutions and insurance companies. Second, CDIC was given more supervisory
scope to mitigate the moral hazard and insurance loss associated with deposit
insurance. And third, very importantly, a newly-created multi-agency Finan-
cial Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC), comprising the Superinten-
dent of Financial Institutions, the Chair of CDIC, the Governor of the Bank
of Canada and the Deputy Minister of Finance, was charged with regularly
discussing issues concerning the supervision of financial institutions,3 includ-
ing the development of strategies to deal with troubled financial institutions.
FISC increased the ability of the various agents to influence supervisory deci-
sion-making and to provide support when confronted with problem institu-
tions. The legislation also gave the Bank of Canada and CDIC the authority to
require OSFI to investigate a financial institution.  Another benefit of FISC is
that it insures accountability in the system through the requirement to minute
2 This episode illustrates the potential conflict that can arise between the goal
of access to regional institutions and that of stability.
3 It was only in 2001 that FISC's mandate was enlarged to include bank holding
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the discussions of the regulators/supervisors and to transmit these minutes to
the Minister of Finance.
Since the late 1980s, the supervisory regime has evolved towards clearer
goals, improved incentives, more accountability and greater and more flexible
authority to act with regard to troubled institutions. In turn, this has strength-
ened the incentives for financial institutions to avoid excessive risks. The
regime was importantly clarified and reinforced in the mid-1990s, not coinci-
dentally following the Bank Act revisions of 1992 which led to major structural
changes and efficiency gains in the financial system. In 1996, OSFI's mandate
with respect to protecting the rights and interests of depositors, policyholders,
and creditors was clarified while allowing financial institutions to compete
effectively and take reasonable risks. This involved not only supervising finan-
cial institutions for soundness and legal compliance, but also promptly signal-
ing and advising a financial institution that fails these criteria, promoting the
adoption of policies and procedures to control and manage risk, and pruden-
tial surveillance of events that may have a negative impact on financial institu-
tions. CDIC and OSFI jointly established a policy of early intervention with
regard to a troubled institution according to four stages of increasing serious-
ness leading to insolvency. OSFI was also given the power to take control of an
institution's assets, or of the institution itself, and through a court order close
the institution. Leading to the early intervention legislation of 1996 were the
heightened concerns about financial stability arising from the recent failures
of Standard Trust Company, Sovereign Life Insurance Company, Confedera-
tion Life Insurance company, and Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna-
tional (BCCI). In 1999, OSFI started applying a framework for evaluating an
institution's risks and the quality of its risk-management practices, and pro-
viding the supervised institutions with its assessment.
Partly in response to the rapid advance and diffusion of information tech-
nology in the 1990s and its perceived transformative role in the provision and
consumption of financial services, the MacKay Task Force on the future of the
Canadian financial services sector provided in 1998 recommendations on how
to enhance competition among, and the competitiveness of, financial institu-
tions, including recommendations on ownership and entry; how to empower
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basic financial services in their community; and how to improve the regulatory
framework. The review process ultimately led to the adoption of Bill C-8 in
2001.
One offshoot of the Bill C-8 was the creation of the Financial Consumer
Agency of Canada (FCAC) to strengthen oversight of consumer issues and
expand consumer education in the financial sector. In July 2010, FCAC was
also tasked with the oversight of payment card network operators and their
commercial practices. For these purposes, it monitors banks, federally incor-
porated or registered insurance, trust and loan companies, federally incorpo-
rated credit unions, retail associations and payment card network operators.
It is interesting to note that while the MacKay Task Force was at work in
1998, large Canadian banks had their eyes on two mergers between them-
selves, which would reduce their number from five to three. Banks claimed
that such mergers would generate economies of scale and boost their interna-
tional competitiveness. The government turned down the proposed mergers
and their potential stimuli to efficiency because of its concern that the Cana-
dian marketplace might not be as well served by a more concentrated oligop-
oly. Thus, concerns about the cost and quality of the financial services
provided to Canadians held in check potential gains in efficiency. Several years
later, Allen and Liu (2005) reached the following conclusions from their
research:
Our findings suggest that, all else held constant, Cana-
dian banks could enjoy cost savings from becoming 
larger. This does not necessarily imply that the same cost 
savings would arise from bank mergers, because the busi-
ness mix and input prices are likely to change after a 
merger. Even if cost savings can be achieved by joining 
two banks, those savings may not be passed on to con-
sumers. Whether savings are passed on depends on the 
market structure and contestability in banks, topics that 
merit further research. (p.81)
Developments on several other fronts have affected the financial system.
Money and capital markets have expanded enormously, with the issuance of
paper, stocks and bonds accounting for an increasing share of corporate sector
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removal of interest rate ceilings on bank lending in the 1967 revisions to the
Bank Act followed by a reduction in the chartered banks' secondary reserve
ratio. This contributed to a sharp expansion of the treasury bill market, which
in turn buttressed the expansion of private capital markets. Since the mid-
1990s, markets for futures and derivatives have experienced considerable
growth and the repo market has become a core funding source for banks and
market makers. Securitization as a source of funding and investment opportu-
nities through fixed-income markets has also grown substantially in impor-
tance until the recent financial crisis. The restructuring of the Canadian stock
exchanges in the late 1990s allowed specialization and enhanced the expansion
of the Montreal and Toronto stock exchanges. While the size, complexity and
inter-connectedness of the financial markets have been increasing markedly
over the last decades, provincial governments have resisted abandoning a
decentralized system of provincial securities regulation in favour of a single
national securities regulator, which likely offers a greater capacity to oversee
effectively the functioning and evolution of securities markets and to establish
effective forms of cooperation with capital market regulators in other coun-
tries.
Another factor contributing to the stability of the Canadian financial system
relates to housing. Not only was the housing price cycle relatively subdued in
Canada over the last decade, but the negative impacts that a fall in housing
price could have had on mortgage defaults, lenders' losses and the value of
mortgage-backed securities were bound to be much smaller than in the United
States. Mortgage lending standards remained relatively high in Canada until
the mid-2000s. Unfortunately, late in the cycle, the government raised the
allowable loan-to-value ratio and increased the maximum amortization period
despite clear evidence of excess demand and rising housing prices. Neverthe-
less, because this was done so late in the housing cycle, it did not do serious
damage and the size of the sub-prime market was relatively small at the outset
of the financial crisis. Moreover,  the quality of verification and documenta-
tion remained relatively high.  
Two other factors prompted financial prudence from Canadian borrowers.
In Canada, the homeowner is personally liable for any deficiency that remains
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the United States.4 In addition, partly because mortgage interest is not tax
deductible in Canada, in contrast with the United States, Canadians have
tended to buy smaller, more affordable homes relative to their income than
Americans would. In the 2000s, greater leverage in the mortgage market
through no money down and extended amortization mortgages were allowed,
but in 2008 the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) ceased
insuring non-prime mortgages and more recently the federal government
tightened macro-prudential rules in regard to mortgages in response to high
household indebtedness. These changes included inter alia shortening of the
amortization period to 30 years (after shortening it from 40 to 35 years in
October 2008), withdrawing CMHC insurance of home equity lines of credit,
a reduction in the maximum refinance percentage from 90 per cent loan-to-
value to 85 percent (after reducing it from 95 to 90 per cent in April 2010), and
requiring a minimum down payment of 20 per cent on non-owner-occupied
properties purchased for speculation.  
The housing sector is particularly sensitive to interest rates and the business
cycle: in periods of high real interest rates, for instance, it contracts more than
the rest of the economy while in periods of low rates, it is prone to excessive
expansion. Not surprisingly, housing price cycles have much larger amplitude
than those of consumer prices. In this light, the CMHC can have a significant
impact on economic stabilization and financial stability through the mortgage
qualification rules they set and the mortgage bonds they buy. As I write, the
Minister of Finance is engaged in an important and timely review of the man-
date of CMHC. Such a review should take into account both the financial sta-
bility and economic stabilization impacts that CMHC policies can have.
Monetary policy experienced regime shifts over the last 40 years, which
eventually led to better macroeconomic outcomes and more efficient financial
markets. Monetary targets prevailed in the late 1970s, followed by a search for
a nominal anchor over much of the 1980s and a shift to inflation-targeting in
the early 1990s (Thiessen, 2001). Inflation-targeting anchored inflation
expectations and contributed to reduced economic volatility and long-term
4 In reference to home foreclosures, lenders can pursue deficiency judgments in
more than 30 states. This includes states such as Florida, New York and Texas.
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interest rates. The publication of the Monetary Policy Report starting in 1995,
the introduction of fixed action dates in December 2000 and the regular
release of the Financial System Review from 2002 onwards buttressed the Bank
of Canada's credibility by increasing transparency and accountability in pol-
icy-making. Fixed action dates also led to improvements in the efficiency of
the Canadian money market. 
The Financial Crisis
Canadian banks fared quite well compared with international competitors
during the financial crisis. They held less toxic assets, had strong capital ratios,
had higher levels of liquid assets as a share of total assets, and had a relatively
high ratio of depository funding (Ratnovski and Huang, 2009). In the back-
ground, rates of mortgage delinquencies and defaults remained low in Canada.
Some Canadian life insurers, on the other hand, suffered large losses from
reserve increases on their variable-annuity and segregated fund guarantees
during the crisis. These insurers continue to face substantial market risk.
While the capital positions of insurers have exceeded the target level imposed
by OSFI, one issue is whether existing capital requirements for segregated-
fund guarantees are high enough. OSFI has released a draft advisory on this.
Canadian financial institutions did not escape financing pressures as fund-
ing markets became quite illiquid for a while. The importance of having con-
tinuous markets became stark, as well as the crucial liquidity supply role of the
central bank and the federal government in helping institutions to obtain
funding without having to engage in fire sales of less liquid assets in illiquid
markets.
Canadian financial institutions started experiencing funding pressures in
the summer of 2007. These pressures intensified in the fall of that year and
then again in the fall of 2008 as counterparty concerns became very serious
following the failure of large financial institutions in foreign markets. Liquid-
ity premia in funding markets for government securities and financial institu-
tions experienced spikes at that time. Funding markets, which include those
for Government of Canada securities, repo, securities lending, unsecured pri-
vate money markets, and foreign exchange provide essential liquidity to, and
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2009). If they dry up, financial institutions and non-financial corporations can
incur very serious liquidity problems as the experiences not only of Lehman
Brothers but also of AAA-rated General Electric in the United States vividly
illustrate. That is where the role of a central bank as lender of last resort comes
into play, and it did in a big way in the advanced economies, including in Can-
ada. The Bank of Canada deployed a range of tools and facilities to provide
liquidity in the system, starting in the summer of 2007 with traditional instru-
ments (overnight special purchase and resale agreements and excess settle-
ment balances) and by the fall of 2007 gradually expanding its framework with
respect to terms to maturity, amounts, counterparties and eligible securities as
the situation deteriorated (Zorn, Wilkins and Engert, 2009). In addition, the
federal government, through CMHC, purchased securitized bundles of
insured mortgages to provide liquidity to the banking system. By the summer
and fall of 2009, financial market conditions had sufficiently improved that the
Bank of Canada withdrew several extraordinary liquidity measures.
The non-bank asset-based commercial paper (ABC)P crisis that erupted in
August 2007 in Canada demonstrated the inherent fragility of the ABCP mar-
ket and the fact that the risks embedded in very complex and opaque financial
products are often not properly communicated to and understood by investors
(Chant, 2008). Issues of non-bank ABCP were exempt from prospectuses so
investors were in the dark concerning the composition and nature of the assets
underlying the ABCP programs. Since the crisis, progress has been made
towards increasing the transparency and disclosure of ABCP programs. These
include “measures undertaken by the Bank of Canada to introduce transpar-
ency requirements and minimum quality standards for ABCP accepted as col-
lateral in its liquidity facilities, increased transparency on the part of bank
sponsors, and enhanced transparency and disclosure measures for both ABCP
and term asset backed securities (ABS) introduced by credit-rating agencies”
(Selody and Woodman, 2009). The failure of authorities to properly assess the
risk associated with exposure to U.S. toxic assets and take remedial action
beforehand suggests that there was a hole in the supervisory net. In the wake
of the ABCP crisis, OSFI emphasized that its mandate focuses on the solvency
of Canadian financial institutions and moreover that many of the firms that
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and therefore not subject to the OSFI B-5 guideline with respect to capital
charges for loans by Canadian banks to ABCP conduits (OSFI, 2008).
The financial crisis raises several issues for the conduct of monetary policy
in Canada and other advanced countries in view of the limitations and poten-
tial of policy interest rates. Besides the problem of the zero lower bound, and
whether price level targeting might help deal with this, there remains the
question of whether the policy rate should be adjusted to supplement the coor-
dinated use of prudential tools when imbalances in a specific market can spill
over to the entire economy. Boivin, Lane and Meh (2010) reckon that this may
be appropriate but that the resulting greater flexibility required in an infla-
tion-targeting regime could be challenging in practice. In their view, more
work is needed to bring understanding of these issues to the level required to
clarify the implications for the monetary policy framework. This being said,
and as I mentioned before, it is important to examine the complementary sta-
bilization role that CMHC might play by adjusting rules for mortgage insur-
ance. Other monetary policy issues of little direct concern to Canada but high
concern elsewhere in the world relate to the use of quantitative easing and
quantitative instruments (e.g. bank reserve requirements, capital controls) as
complements to the policy interest rate. The former has been used by the
United States and the United Kingdom and the latter by emerging market
economies. The end of monetary policy history has not yet arrived.
Financial Reform
What lies ahead in Canada is essentially an agenda spearheaded by public
authorities to buttress financial stability in conformity with the G-20 reform
blueprint. This agenda aims at improving the resiliency of financial institu-
tions, building robust financial markets and reducing the interconnectedness
between institutions and markets (Carney, 2010).
At the core of decreasing the vulnerability of financial institutions to booms
and busts are the provisions of the Basel III agreement to create global stan-
dards for liquidity, raise the quantity and quality of Tier 1 capital, and intro-
duce a leverage ratio and a capital conservation buffer, to be complemented by
a countercyclical buffer which would vary over time. As an economist I would
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non-transparency the governor would negotiate the amount of hidden
reserves that banks would have to hold, in effect activating countercyclical
buffers. Nowadays, regulators must be totally transparent and follow rules
rather than judgment. An effective mechanism of countercyclical buffer, how-
ever, is difficult to design. Nevertheless, in the more principles-based system
we have in Canada, I believe it is worth exploring further whether such mech-
anism cannot be implemented. The timetable for full implementation of Basel
III extends to 2019. It should be noted that Canada has had a tier one capital
target of 7 per cent going back to 1999, that 75 per cent of that tier one capital
has had to be in common shares, and that a maximum leverage ratio, of 20 to
1, has been in force throughout that time.
As a complement to capital and liquidity rules for banks, introducing
counter-cyclically variable rules for allowable loan-to-value ratio and maxi-
mum amortization period for government-insured mortgages would be an
effective way to deal with the inherent swings between exuberance and exces-
sive pessimism in the housing market. While this would be politically difficult,
a clear assignment of a stabilization rule to CMHC would certainly contribute
to greater stability in both the housing market and financial markets generally.
As a further complement, an OSFI draft advisory has proposed implement-
ing capital standards with regard to the segregated-fund guarantees of Cana-
dian life insurers, which would better cover all risks associated with  equity
holdings. 
The key initiative for making financial markets more robust is reforming
Canadian markets for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives as per a G-20 com-
mitment. This calls for standardized OTC derivatives to be traded on
exchanges or electronic platforms and cleared through central counterparties
(CCPs) by end-2012. An inter-agency working group, chaired by the Bank of
Canada, issued a discussion paper in October 2010 and the Canadian Securi-
ties Administrators, gathering provincial regulators, issued a consultation
paper in November 2010. In parallel, the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Cor-
poration is working on developing a CCP for the Canadian repo markets to
make these markets more efficient in good times and less vulnerable in diffi-
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dardization and CCPs will reduce counterparty risk, increase transparency
and help prevent spillover effects of an institution's failure.
Many possible measures have been proposed for dealing with bank resolu-
tion – the risks posed by large, interconnected institutions. These include inter
alia capital surcharges, systemic risk levies and living wills. The U.S. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was signed into
law in July 2010, advocates that “no bank or financial institution that contains
a bank will own, invest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund, or
proprietary trading operations unrelated to serving customers for its own
profit.” The preliminary report of the Vickers Commission in the United
Kingdom does not go as far as recommending a separation of the commercial
from the investment banking operations of banks, but advocates ring-fencing
their retail arms and imposing a 10 per cent equity tier one capital ratio on sys-
temically important lenders. For Canada, contingent capital, which has been
the object of proposals by OSFI and the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (BCBS), seems the preferred tool for dealing with bank resolution.
They would improve the capacity of the private sector to contribute to the res-
olution of failing banks while reducing risks to the public sector and improv-
ing incentives to limit risk-taking. One important measure to clarify in order
to promote investors' interest in contingent convertibles is the conversion cri-
teria.
The new capital and liquidity rules will impose transitory economic costs
over the medium term. The OECD has recently estimated that the higher cap-
ital requirements of Basel III effective as of 2019 would increase bank lending
spreads by about 50 basis points over about five years, thereby cutting GDP
growth in the United States, Europe and Japan by an average 0.15 percentage
points per annum over this period (Slovik and Cournède, 2011). In my view,
these estimates are likely to be somewhat too low. A significantly greater
impact was estimated by the Institute of International Finance. The right
answer probably lies somewhere in between.
Over and above the warranted costs of higher capital requirements, the pre-
cise and detailed rules proposed will add to operational and compliance costs
for banks and financial intermediaries. In principle, higher capital and liquid-
ity ratios are warranted but the detailed application rules seen so far would add98 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
greatly to the deadweight cost of regulation. Canadian financial institutions
understand the need for better risk management and would benefit from the
greater confidence that higher ratios would bring to markets. But compliance
with the excessively detailed and intrusive operational controls implied by the
proposed international rules would increase the cost of financial intermedia-
tion in Canada. Canada should avoid slavish adherence to the details of Basel
III. Our system of principles-based regulation should continue to serve us
well, even more so in a context where most national regulators elsewhere will
not conform to the detailed, uniform international standards. What is
required here in Canada is a high degree of cooperation between regulators
and financial institutions to achieve stability goals. In the past, such coopera-
tion in designing principles-based regulation has strengthened the Canadian
system. We should not lose that advantage as we move forward.  The long run
stability benefits flowing from greater capital and liquidity requirements
should outweigh transition costs provided that the new principles are applied
in a way that minimizes the deadweight loss of operational inefficiency. 
Balancing Efficiency And Stability
The experience of the last half century suggests that the solid, consistent
performance of the Canadian financial system benefitted considerably from
the reasonable balance between efficiency and stability that has prevailed in
the Canadian financial system. Financial institutions have grown profitably
and financial markets have expanded in scope and depth, but excessive lever-
age and risk-taking have been held in check, at least in part by well coordinated
regulation and supervision and macro-prudential rules. The financial sector
has provided a greatly expanded array of financial services and products to
Canadian households and firms. Moreover, efficiency gains in the provision of
such services have been passed on at least in part to customers, reflecting com-
petition in the sector and market contestability through the potential entry of
new firms.
Barring extraordinary shocks, global financial stability should be buttressed
in the years to come as financial systems are repaired and reformed. The asso-
ciated adjustment costs should be significantly lower in Canada than in most
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regulatory framework. But of course we need to proceed in a way that mini-
mizes the deadweight cost of regulation. Canada will nonetheless remain vul-
nerable to contagion from financial troubles elsewhere in the world and their
collateral damage in terms of external demand. It therefore stands to benefit a
lot not only from more resilient financial institutions and markets in Canada
but also, and perhaps even more, from financial reform elsewhere in the world
even if it entails transitory collateral damage for Canada in terms of slower
growth in external demand.
Efficiency remains of paramount importance for economic prosperity, per-
haps even more so than before given the need to mitigate the expected (tran-
sitory) rise in the cost of capital to firms and households as a result of more
stringent capital and liquidity requirements for financial institutions in the
years ahead. Preserving, if not enhancing, competition and market contest-
ability may be the best way to promote efficiency gains and the transmission of
the resulting cost reductions to Canadian households and firms. This tradi-
tional concern of Canadian policy makers since at least the Porter Commis-
sion is well worth preserving.
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